Voters who are strategic may choose to update their vote after seeing the other votes. We study how and when process continues until convergence, and how it is affected by voters’ uncertainty.
- Iterative voting. Reshef Meir. In Ulle Endriss, Trends in Computational Social Choice. AI Access. 2017, pp. 69-86. [online book] ← start here
- Iterative Voting and Acyclic Games. Reshef Meir, Maria Polukarov, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein and Nick Jennings. 2017, Artificial Intelligence, 252:100-122. [article]
- Convergence of Iterative Combinatorial Voting under Uncertainty. Joshua Kavner, Reshef Meir, Francesca Rossi and Lirong Xia. IJCAI 2023. [Arxiv]
- Heuristic Voting as Ordinal Dominance Strategies, Omer Lev, Reshef Meir, Svetlana Obraztsova and Maria Polukarov. AAAI 2019. [Arxiv]
- A Local-Dominance Theory of Voting Equilibria. Reshef Meir, Omer Lev, and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. ACM-EC 2014. [Arxiv]
- Plurality Voting under Uncertainty, Reshef Meir. AAAI 2015 [Arxiv]